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KMID : 0364920140390030127
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Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
2014 Volume.39 No. 3 p.127 ~ p.133
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Estimation of Uranium Particle Concentration in the Korean Peninsula Caused by North Korea‘s Uranium Enrichment Facility
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Kwak Sung-Woo
Kang Han-Byeol
Shin Jung-Ki
Lee Jung-Hyun
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Abstract
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North Korea’s uranium enrichment facility is a matter of international concern. It is of particular alarming to SouthKorea with regard to the security and safety of the country. This situation requires continuous monitoring of the DPRK andemergency preparedness on the part of the ROK. To assess the detectability of an undeclared uranium enrichment plant inNorth Korea, uranium concentrations in the air at both a short and a long distance from the enrichment facility wereestimated. UF6 source terms were determined by using existing information on North Korean facility and data from theoperation experience of enrichment plants from other countries. Using the calculated source terms, two atmospheric dispersionmodels (Gaussian Plume Model and HYSPLIT models) and meteorological data were used to estimate the uranium particleconcentrations from the Yongbyon enrichment facility. A maximum uranium concentration and its location are dependentupon the meteorological conditions and the height of the UF6 release point. This study showed that the maximum uraniumconcentration around the enrichment facility was about 1.0 x 10-7g?m-3. The location of the maximum concentration was withinabout 0.4 km of the facility. It has been assumed that the uranium sample of about a few micrograms (μg) could be obtained;and that few micrograms of uranium can be easily measured with current measurement instruments. On the contrary, auranium concentration at a distance of more than 100 kilometers from the enrichment facility was estimated to be about 1.0x 10-13∼ 1.0 x 10-15 g?m-3, which is less than back- ground level. Therefore, based on the results of our paper, an air sampletaken within the vicinity of the Yongbyon enrichment facility could be used to determine as to whether or not North Koreais carrying out an undeclared nuclear program. However, the air samples taken at a longer distance of a few hundredkilometers would prove difficult in detecting a clandestine nuclear activities.
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KEYWORD
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Uranium enrichment facility, Nuclear material, Centrifuge method, Safeguard inspection, Undeclared nuclear activity, Uranium hexa-fluoride(UF6)
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