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KMID : 0365220210580020039
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Korean Journal of Public Health
2021 Volume.58 No. 2 p.39 ~ p.58
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Automatic Stabilizers for Excess Vaccine Stockpiles: Responsibility and Vaccine Equity in an Age of Pandemics
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Heo Sang-Beom
Kim Dae-Han
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Abstract
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Objectives: This study illustrates inequitable structural dynamics involved in the procurement and distribution of COVID-19 and other pandemic vaccines and argues for an ‘automatic stabilizer’ for more equitable vaccine distributions in future pandemics.
Methods: The methods used in this paper mainly involve game theoretical analysis of globally unequal vaccine distributions during the COVID-19 pandemic and a survey of relevant empirical literature on outcomes of this unequal vaccine distribution. The appendix applies four relevant ethical frameworks to deepen the normative discussion of issues that inequitable distributions of pandemic vaccines raise.
Results: The structural incentives involved in COVID-19 vaccine procurements and distributions make them multi-state prisoners’ dilemmas, likely to be replicated in similar future pandemics. The inequality which characterizes pandemic vaccine distributions is inequitable and therefore intuitively objectionable. Sufficient structural similarities between the distribution of economic resources during recessions and the distribution of vaccines during pandemics mean that there is a good candidate solution for inequitable pandemic vaccine distributions, namely an automatic stabilizer for vaccine stockpiles.
Conclusion: The prevention of unacceptable distributions of pandemic vaccines requires greater transparency on vaccine purchasing, manufacturing and distributions as well as politically credible pre-commitments to an equitable distribution of vaccines in future pandemics, plausibly through an international treaty regime.
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KEYWORD
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COVID-19, Vaccine, Pandemics, Public Health, Ethics, Game Theory
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