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KMID : 1011120140080020177
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Bioethics Policy Studies
2014 Volume.8 No. 2 p.177 ~ p.201
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The Right to Life of the Human Embryos from the Perspective of Neuroscience
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Yoo Kyoung-Dong
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Abstract
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According to the main purpose of Bioethics and Safety Act, “no one shall produce embryos other than for the purpose of pregnancy.” However, under the current Act, the human embryo should not be regarded with the same legal status as a human being. It does not admit the right to life of the human embryos.
But the increasing knowledge of the human brain has opened a new horizon for the understanding of human beings and found that the human embryos can be treated with the same legal standard as a human being because they are linked to the origins of the human life.
In this regard, neuroscience encompasses various issues in connection with the brain and the embryo, allows us to understand how the human embryos contribute to the moral and ethical judgements in the course of the early stage of the brain growth.
In the discussion of neuroscience in regard to the issues of moral potential of the human embryos, the theories of epiphenomenalism, dualistic interactionalism, substance dualism, mind/brain identity theory, and mentalism are engaged to explore the meaning of human life, free will, and moral subjectivity.
After considering all the factors of the above issues briefly, this paper comes to a conclusion that the right to life of the human embryos must not be limited but be considered as valuable as that of a human being. To achieve this goal, the government and scientific communities are encouraged to revise the standard of the right to life for the human embryos, earliest forms of human beings, and reestablish supervision on life ethics.
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KEYWORD
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embryo, bioethics, neuroethics, human brain, liberation biology, epiphenomenalism, dualistic interactionalism, substance dualism, mind/brain identity theory, and mentalism
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