Àá½Ã¸¸ ±â´Ù·Á ÁÖ¼¼¿ä. ·ÎµùÁßÀÔ´Ï´Ù.
KMID : 1124020100260040459
Korean Social Security Studies
2010 Volume.26 No. 4 p.459 ~ p.487
Constitutionalism and Welfare Rights: Sunstein, Michelman, Barber, and Liu
Jung Hyuk-In

Abstract
With constitutional welfare rights, ought a democracy to make sure that people will live in universally acceptable decent conditions? Over whether it is agreeable idea thus to confer full constitutional legal status upon welfare rights guarantees of this kind, public opinion diverges. Being no way of explaining for which issues a fair majoritarian process decides on what we the people ought to do, four proposals to put positive and economic guarantees into constitutional law from the diverse points of view in contemporary political theories typically meet objections linked to democratic legitimacy, judicial review, negative liberties, and institutional feasibility. In their suggestions, Sunstein, Michelman, Barber, and Liu argues that constitutional welfare rights should be understood, what ever else they may also be, primarily as desirable and feasible prescriptions in terms of, respectively, anticaste principle in deliberative democracy, Rawlsian liberal legitimacy in constitutional contract, general welfare in the Federalist Papers, and interpretive understanding in Walzerian spherical justice. Some critical remarks and often-underrated merits presented.
KEYWORD
constitutional welfare rights, anticaste principle, deliberative democracy, liberal legitimacy, constitutional contract, general welfare, the Federalist Papers, social goods, shared understanding, spheres of justice
FullTexts / Linksout information
Listed journal information
ÇмúÁøÈïÀç´Ü(KCI)