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KMID : 1172020210220020019
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Journal of Korean Bioethics Association
2021 Volume.22 No. 2 p.19 ~ p.36
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Against the Right to Kill Oneself
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Yoon Jun-Sik
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Abstract
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Dworkin argues that if 'Margo', a dementia patient, asked to be killed as soon as possible without pain after developing dementia through a kind of advance directives, we should follow the decision to respect her human dignity. Even if Margo is currently living happy life and is clearly afraid of and rejects death. The purpose of this article is to define the 'right to kill oneself,' which considers oneself or one's future appearance as an animal and irrational object, and to autonomously decide to suspend one's life based on the judgment that one's life is useless, as well as to reveal the ethical difficulties that exercising this right may present. Margo's decision can be immoral in two ways. First, Margo’s decision might have been motivated by an irrational disgust to living with dementia. Second, the concept of autonomy, which is used to justify Margo's decision, can provide a discursive effect that distinguishes between reason and irrationality and justifies the latter's exclusion. Margo's decision is better understood as the exercise of the 'right to kill oneself,' which displays the unethical component of self-objectification, rather than the concept of the 'right to die,' which is linked nowadays to the 'realization of natural death.' The 'right to kill oneself' is tightly linked to the disgust to irrational existence and the discourse of autonomy that justifies the exclusion of irrationality. It appears impossible to be recognized as an ethical right worthy of our community's guarantee.
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KEYWORD
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right to kill oneself, dementia, advance medical directives, disgust, autonomy, human dignity
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