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KMID : 0387320210310040479
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Korean Journal of Health Policy and Administration
2021 Volume.31 No. 4 p.479 ~ p.490
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A Study on the Refusal of National Examination for Medical Students: Focusing on the Signaling Game Theory
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Hyeon Seung-Hyo
Kim Da-Young
Lee Min-Kyu
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Abstract
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Background: Conflict in the medical world in 2020 led to the rejection of the national examination for doctors. This study explainedthe process until the end of the national test refusal situation triggered in 2020 through the signaling game theory. The governmenthas succeeded in requiring medical students to take the national exam.
Methods: To explain the rejection of the national examination, we first compose and show an example of two small non-signalinggames where medical students know which type the government is of, then combine them to play a signaling game.
Results: The behavior of the government and medical students was examined through the signaling game model. In the context ofthe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the government makes an ultimatum, whatever the type. And the medicalstudents accept it. They judged that the government could not be expected to abolish the policy. If COVID-19 had not occurred,medical students would have been able to continue the confrontation.
Conclusion: The government instilled in the other party the perception that the government would not bend its policies because itwas the surly type and would not be afraid of a strong confrontation. Through the image created in this way, the government wasforced to accept the ultimatum by medical students. Academically, this study is to deal with the policy-making process through thesignaling game theory. In the area of health care policy, this study suggests that various situations such as the type of governmentor the spread of COVID-19 can become important in addition to the rationality of the policy itself.
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KEYWORD
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Ultimatum game, Government, Medical students, Reputation
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