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KMID : 0613620150350040005
Health Social Welfare Review
2015 Volume.35 No. 4 p.5 ~ p.34
Discussions on the Empirical Study on Health Care Consumptions by Private Health Insurance Policyholders
½Å±âö:Shin Kee-Chul
ÀúÀÚ¾øÀ½:No authors listed
Abstract
The Korean government allowed life insurers to sell indemnity type complementary health insurances according to the revised Insurance Act in 2003. Since then, moral hazard caused by policyholders has been an important subject of empirical studies. Several studies were conducted based on sampling, some others on panel data. Although most researchers had anticipated moral azards, their studies did not show significant differences in medical consumptions between policyholders and non-policyholders. They did not consider the characteristics of each disease and the types of private health insurances. Individuals¡¯ consumption of health care services such as doctor consultations and their health care spending vary widely across diseases. Policyholders of indemnity type insurance plans do not have incentives for moral hazard in doctor consultations because of its own deductibles hich are similar to those of the National Health Insurance. Lump sum type insurance plans indemnify fixed amount costs caused by specified diseases and do not cover doctor consultations. This paper analyses the types of private health insurance and the effects on medical consumptions. For statistically meaningful empirical studies, it is necessary to compare health care consumptions in people with different diseases.
KEYWORD
Moral Hazard, Private Health Insurance, Empirical Studies, Lump Sum Type, Indemnity Type
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